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Abstract 
The perception of time is distorted by many factors (e.g., arousal, temperature, age etc.), but 
is it possible that causality would affect our perception of time? We investigate timing 
changes in the temporal binding effect, which refers to a subjective shortening of the interval 
between actions and their outcomes. Four experiments investigated whether binding may be 
due to variations in the rate of an internal clock. Specifically, we asked whether binding 
reflects changes to a general timing system, or a dedicated clock unique to causal sequences. 
We developed a novel experimental paradigm (embedded interval estimation procedure) in 
which participants made temporal judgments of either causal or non causal intervals, or the 
duration of an event embedded within that interval. Stimuli and modality were combined 
factorially, with interval markers and embedded events being either visual or auditory. While 
we replicated the temporal binding effect, we found no evidence for commensurate changes 
to time perception of the embedded event, which suggests that temporal binding is effected 
by changes to a specific and dedicated, rather than a general clock system. 
Keywords: Temporal binding; Causality; Internal clock models; Time perception; 
Action-outcome learning 
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Public Impact Statement 
 
Time perception is an intuitive and ubiquitous concept. Adages like ‘the watched pot 
never boils’ and ‘time flies when you’re having fun’ are ubiquitous in everyday parlance. 
Both sayings refer to the perceived rate of time: in the former, time appears to move slowly, 
while the opposite is true in the latter. Research finds that perceived time is affected by 
emotions, arousal, temperature, and modality of the content of experience (e.g., auditory or 
visual). An additional concept however, that also affects temporal judgments is causality; 
causes and effects are perceived as subjectively closer in time than two unrelated events, 
while duration timing tasks find that cause-effect intervals are judged as shorter than intervals 
separating unconnected events. Here we show that this causal binding effect is specific to the 
interval separating the cause from its effect: Causality slows down time perception only for 
the cause-effect interval; temporal perception for unrelated concurrent events remains 
unaffected.  This finding is problematic for the folk notion of a single ‘internal clock’, but 
can be explained by theories postulating multiple clocks operating in parallel.  
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Temporal binding and internal clocks: 
No evidence for general pacemaker slowing 
 
Temporal binding refers to the perceptual attraction of actions to their effects 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). When an action triggers a causal outcome, the action is 
perceived to occur later, and its outcome earlier, than two unrelated events. One suggestion is 
that temporal binding is a bi-directional constraint of Bayesian causal inference (Eagleman & 
Holcombe, 2002): The closer together two events occur in time, the more likely they will be 
judged as causally related (e.g. Buehner, 2005). Consequently, it follows that if two events 
are known to be causally related, they are also more likely to be contiguous in time. 
Early experiments (Haggard et al., 2002) on temporal binding used the Libet clock 
method (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), in which participants watch a fast-moving 
clock hand (one rotation every 2560ms) while experiencing different events. The participant 
has to report the hand position at the time when she perceives a target event. Judgment errors 
derived over repeated trials are then used as a proxy measure of event awareness. Using this 
method, Haggard et al. found a systematic shift in judgment errors for causal actions (key 
presses), which triggered an outcome (tone) after 250ms. More specifically, participants 
showed delayed awareness of their causal action, and early awareness of its consequence, 
relative to single-event judgment errors. In other words, actions and outcomes mutually 
attracted each other in subjective awareness. This temporal binding effect did not occur when 
participants reported the times of two unrelated events (Haggard et al., 2002).   
Studies using the stimulus anticipation method (SAM) have replicated and expanded 
upon the temporal binding effect (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012). In the 
SAM, participants have to press a key in anticipation of a target event. A series of studies 
using the SAM has repeatedly demonstrated early anticipation of target events that were 
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triggered by a causal relation, compared to targets that were equally predictable, but were 
merely associated with the predictor, rather than caused by it. Specifically, Buehner & 
Humphreys (2009) found that it is not sufficient for an intentional action to be followed by 
the target – the action has to cause it. Furthermore, even a non-intentional mechanical cause 
that triggers an outcome results in binding (Buehner, 2012). Thus, the ability to predict the 
outcome via association is not sufficient to elicit temporal binding. Instead, a more 
meaningful link (i.e., causality) is both necessary and sufficient to bind events together in 
subjective time.     
However, temporal binding occurs not only in the form of shifts in the perception of 
events delineating an interval, but also manifests itself via direct distortions of time 
perception. For example, Humphreys & Buehner (2009) found verbal estimates of intervals 
separating causal actions from their outcomes to be reliably lower than estimates of intervals 
separating two unrelated events. These changes also occur when participants reproduce the 
experienced interval (by holding down a key for the duration of the experienced interval; 
Humphreys & Buehner, 2010), or when they compare target intervals to standards in a 
method of constant stimuli (Nolden, Haering, & Kiesel, 2012). Thus, temporal binding 
manifests itself both via shifts in event perception as well as a direct shortening of 
experienced time.  
Theoretical accounts of temporal binding 
Eagleman and Holcombe (2002) suggest that temporal binding arises due to a 
recalibration of sensory streams: Differences in processing latencies associated with different 
modalities are overcome by realigning sensory streams, thus ensuring a unitary percept. 
Because motor acts usually produce causal outcomes immediately, a delay between action 
and outcome forces a recalibration of the system. A short delay between an action and its 
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outcome, it is argued, can be adapted to, thus realigning the perceptual-motor system to bring 
action and outcome closer together in time.  
In contrast, temporal binding could also arise due to changes in time perception. Our 
sense of time is distorted by various factors (for example arousal, Droit-Volet & Meck, 2007; 
Penton-Voak, Edwards, Percival, & Wearden, 1996). These distortions are typically 
explained by cognitive models (commonly referred to as ‘internal clock’ models), such as 
scalar expectancy theory (SET: Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984). Internal clock models 
contain a pacemaker-accumulator process that represents perceived durations: A pacemaker 
emits pulses at rate r, which are counted in an accumulator; changes to r affect temporal 
judgments, such that decreases and increases in r result in respectively fewer and more pulses 
accumulated in a given interval I. Consequently, increases and decreases in r will lead to 
changes in the temporal perception of I. Additionally, timing latencies can also influence the 
temporal perception of I, via changes in the precision of an attentional switch. To begin 
timing I, the switch closes and pulses are accumulated; likewise, to stop timing I, the switch 
opens and no further pulses are accumulated. A late closure of the switch will result in a 
latency Lc between actual and perceived onset of I. Similarly, earlier switch opening will 
result in a latency Lo between actual and perceived offset of I. Both Lc and Lo will result in 
fewer pulses accumulated in interval I. Thus, changes in either Lc, Lo (or both), or changes in 
r will the influence temporal perception of I.  
An example of pacemaker rate change is evidenced in Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, and 
Percival (1998). They found that auditory stimuli are perceived as longer then visual stimuli, 
and, more importantly, that regressions of subjective over objective durations yielded a 
higher slope for auditory compared to visual stimuli.  In other words, the difference between 
judgments in the two modalities grew as a function of duration, as would be expected by 
differences in r. Might it be possible that changes in the causal nature of event sequences 
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likewise lead to modulation of pacemaker speed, whereby causal intervals are perceived as 
shorter due to a slower r? To date, there exists only one study that directly investigated this 
possibility (Wenke & Haggard, 2009).   
Empirical evidence for clock slowing in temporal binding 
Wenke and Haggard (2009) combined the temporal binding procedure with a 
temporal discrimination paradigm: In a causal condition, participants pressed a key to 
generate a tone after 600, 800 or 1000 ms; in a corresponding non-causal condition, their 
finger was passively pulled down by a motor, which was followed by a tone – the computer 
scheduled both events, making it obvious that there was no causal connection between the 
passive movement and the tone. In addition, participants experienced two electric shocks 
administered via electrodes on their fingers. On a given trial, participants were prompted to 
either report whether the shocks were successive or simultaneous, or to estimate the duration 
of the action/movement – tone interval. In addition to replicating the binding effect, Wenke 
and Haggard found that simultaneity detection on causal trials was poorer (i.e., higher 
thresholds) compared to noncausal trials. This is what would be predicted if temporal binding 
is effected via a slowing of the internal clock: a slowing of r lengthens the period between 
pulses, increasing the likelihood that two sequential shocks fall into the same period, which 
in turn leads to higher discrimination thresholds.   
However, considering Wenke and Haggard’s (2009) design reveals that we have to be 
careful in interpreting their results. It is possible that the higher discrimination thresholds 
they found in causal trials simply reflect a transient, effector-specific modulation of the 
pacemaker induced by motor action. For example, Tomassini, Gori, Baud-Bovy, Sandini, and 
Morrone (2014) investigated time perception surrounding the initiation of voluntary hand 
movements. Prior to and immediately following movement, participants received two tactile 
taps, separated by a fixed interval, followed by a second pair of variable-spaced taps toward 
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the end of each trial. Tactile pads were attached to the moving hand in one condition, and the 
static hand in another. Participants had to judge the duration of the second pair of variable-
spaced taps in relation to the first, which allowed derivation of the subjective point of 
equality (PSE). Tomassini et al. found shorter PSEs for conditions where the taps were 
delivered to the moving hand relative to when the taps were delivered to the hand not 
implicated in the movement. In other words, Tomassini et al. found effector-specific time 
contraction immediately before and during hand movements. Note that in this study, 
participants merely moved their hand back and forth, with no noticeable outcome. Thus, 
although there was no temporal binding, there was evidence of transient, effector-specific 
temporal compression before and during hand movement. It is therefore likely, that Wenke 
and Haggard’s (2009) result of poorer temporal discrimination following voluntary finger 
movement is attributable to the same processes, which are independent of temporal binding.  
A final issue concerns the theoretical application of the internal clock in Wenke and 
Haggard’s (2009) study. Internal clock models are primarily concerned with interval timing 
(Wearden, 2003) and are not traditionally applied to simultaneity judgments. Judging whether 
two events were simultaneous or not, while doubtlessly involving temporal processes, is not 
the same as judging the length of an interval. At best, the former probes interval perception 
implicitly, using an event perception measure (i.e., simultaneity judgments) as a proxy, while 
the latter directly taps internal clock processes. Eagleman (2008) and Pariyadath and 
Eagleman, (2007) provide tentative evidence that duration and simultaneity judgments indeed 
are underpinned by separate mechanisms. For example, Pariyadath and Eagleman used the 
oddball technique to study whether timing is a single entity (i.e., general) or is served by 
independent processes. Their participants viewed sequences of visual stimuli, during which 
an unexpected stimulus is embedded (e.g., a clock is presented during a series of shoe 
images). Results showed that duration judgments were longer for oddballs than for the 
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surrounding images, when in fact each image was displayed for the same duration. However, 
this subjective temporal expansion did not generalize to other temporal abilities such as 
critical flicker fusion. Eagleman (2008) noted that “duration, simultaneity, temporal order, 
flicker rate, and other judgments are underpinned by different mechanisms that normally 
concur but are not required to” (p. 134). This means that decreases in subjective duration do 
not necessarily guarantee decreases in thresholds on a temporal simultaneity task, or vice 
versa. Thus, there are several reasons why it is not clear whether the differential temporal 
discrimination reported by Wenke & Haggard’s indeed reflects changes to r. 
Scope 
In light of these concerns, we set out to investigate more carefully whether temporal 
binding might implicate changes to r. It is important to note that changes to internal clock 
processes in temporal binding may manifest in two distinct ways: First, temporal binding 
might reflect a general slowing of the timing system; secondly binding might only affect 
clock processes that are specific to the action-outcome interval. According to the first 
possibility, a slowing of a general all-purpose clock would result in perceptual changes to any 
temporal stimulus presented simultaneously with the interval. According to the latter, effects 
of clock slowing will be limited to the causal interval. Therefore, a key question we ask is 
whether clock slowing is a general or specific process.       
We developed a new embedded interval estimation procedure to address this question. 
Given that previous research has shown that temporal binding is rooted in causality (Buehner, 
2015, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009), occurs 
across various stimulus modalities and tasks (Haering & Kiesel, 2014, 2015; Humphreys & 
Buehner, 2009, 2010), and does not merely reflect processes related to motor preparation and 
execution, we focused our efforts on a simple causal versus non-causal interval distinction: In 
the experiments reported here, causal intervals were delineated by a participant’s key press, 
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which always caused a sensory outcome after a delay, while noncausal intervals were 
delineated by two sequential sensory outcomes. This manner of operationalizing causal and 
noncausal intervals presented the most efficient method of manipulating causality. The key 
difference is that in causal intervals, only a key press triggers an outcome, hence the action is 
causally related to the outcome stimulus. In noncausal trials, the interval markers (the visual 
change and the outcome stimulus) are not causally related but are merely associated - the 
outcome always follows the visual change. Critically, we embedded an additional event into 
certain trials at different points; sometimes this event occurred before the interval, in other 
trials it occurred during the interval, and in others not at all.  
One may at this point ask how causality could possibly influence pacemaker function, 
given that we can only be sure of causality after the outcome has occurred and not at the time 
of action (there is a rich literature in in cognitive science on this, based on David Hume’s 
(1888/1739) empiricism; for an overview see Cheng & Buehner, 2012).  In other words, the 
pacemaker has no information about causality until the outcome occurs, at which time the 
switch closes, thereby stopping pulses accumulating. However, Moore and Haggard (2008), 
using the Libet clock method described earlier (Libet et al., 1983), demonstrated that 
temporal causal binding occurs not only due to retrospective awareness of causality, but also 
due to the prediction of causal relations. They contrasted a predictable condition (a key press 
produced a tone on 75% of trials), with an unpredictable condition (a key press produced a 
tone on 50% of trials). This allowed them to study the extent of perceptual shifts when a 
causal action was followed by its outcome as well as when it failed to do so. On trials where 
the action did not produce an outcome, Moore and Haggard found a larger subjective shift of 
actions towards (expected, but absent) tones in the 75% compared to 50% conditions. In 
other words, when participants expected an outcome, they experienced binding even when in 
fact no outcome occurred.  Furthermore, Moore et al. (2009) showed that the extent of 
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binding varies as a function of the contingency, in line with a causal theory of binding. In our 
experiments the action-outcome contingency was set to 100% (i.e. perfect predictability). It is 
therefore reasonable to assume that participants would show strong binding effects based on 
cause-effect predictability. This, in turn, means that pacemaker rate could, at least in principle, 
be affected by our manipulation of causality.  
The four experiments reported in this paper factorially combined stimulus modality 
(auditory, visual) with event type (outcome, embedded event), as follows: In Experiments 1 
and 2, the outcome event marking the end of the overall interval was visual (a flash), while in 
Experiments 3 and 4, the outcome was an auditory click. Furthermore, the embedded event 
was auditory (a constant tone of variable duration) in Experiments 1 and 3, and visual (a flash 
of a polygon of variable duration) in Experiments 2 and 4. In other words, in Experiments 1 
and 4, the embedded event and the outcome event marking the end of the interval were of 
different modalities, while they were of the same modality in Experiments 2 and 3. In all 
experiments, participants had to estimate the duration of either the overall interval, or the 
embedded event. If causality-induced clock slowing is general, then embedded event 
estimates should be shorter for events embedded into causal intervals, compared to events 
embedded into noncausal intervals. Alternatively, if clock slowing pertains only to the cause-
effect interval then estimates for embedded events should not differ between causal and 
noncausal conditions. This would necessitate multiple clocks operating in parallel, rather than 
a single clock system: One clock might time the interval and another the embedded event (see 
Eagleman, 2008; Klapproth, 2011; we return to this point in the General Discussion). 
Likewise, if temporal binding does not implicate any changes to clock speed, then there 
should also be no differences in the estimates for embedded events (see Figure 1 for a 
schematic of model predictions). Because there are modality-specific differences in the 
timing of auditory versus visual events (Wearden et al., 1998), we decided to factorially 
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combine stimulus modality with event type in a 2 x 2 design to ensure that whatever effects 
we may find are not confined to a particular modality. 
Experiments 1 and 2 
A key concern in developing the embedded interval estimation procedure was to 
ensure that the embedded stimulus was independent of the main interval. More specifically, 
embedded events had to be perceived as causally unrelated to key presses. To make it clear 
that the embedded event was independent of the action, we scheduled one-third of trials to 
contain an embedded event before the key press, one-third after the key press, and one-third 
to contain no embedded event. To achieve this, we used an algorithm that predicted a 
participant’s key press time for each causal trial, and scheduled delivery of the embedded 
event either before or after this predicted time. In noncausal trials we employed stimulus 
delivery times recorded from participants in a pilot experiment using the same algorithm
2
. 
This procedure ensured noncausal trials mirrored causal trials as closely as possible. 
Participants were asked to estimate the duration of either the interval or the embedded 
event. To make sure that they focus on all aspects of the task, participants were not told 
which event they had to estimate until the end of each trial. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five students (32 female, 3 male, Mage = 19.9 years, age range: 17-40) of 
Cardiff University participated in Experiment 1, and 34 (32 female, 2 male, Mage = 18.9 years, 
age range: 18-22) in Experiments 2. Students were provided with course credits or £5 
payment. 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The experiment was implemented in Psychopy (Peirce, 2007) on PCs connected to 
19” monitor with resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. The embedded event was a tone (523.25 
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Hz) in Experiment 1 and a yellow polygon (vertices bounded by a 270 x 210 pixel [6.21° x 
4.83°] rectangle) in Experiment 2, of either 300 or 500 ms duration. In both experiments a 
1000 ms presentation of a red square (400 pixels
2
 [9.19°]) served as the outcome on causal 
trials and marked the end of noncausal intervals. A black square (400 pixels
2
 [9.19°]) was 
presented at the beginning of each trial in all experiments. All visual stimuli were presented 
centrally on the screen. 
Design and procedure  
Three factors were employed in the study: Trial Type consisted of two levels (causal, 
noncausal), Embedded Event Location of three levels (before interval, during interval, no 
event) and Embedded Event Duration of two levels (300, 500 ms). Dependent variables 
(measured on separate trials) were estimates of overall interval and embedded event duration.  
Figure 2 shows the trial structure of Experiment 1. Causal trials began with the black 
square on the screen. Participants pressed a key at a time of their choice. This led to the 
immediate disappearance of the black square, and triggered the red square after a random 
interval (range 700-1300 ms). Noncausal trials also began with the black square, which 
remained on the screen according to a predetermined time derived from the causal trials of 
previous pilot participants as explained below; following the disappearance of the black 
square, the red square appeared after a random interval of the same 700-1300ms range. Both 
types of trials were presented in blocks of 30 trials, 10 of which were scheduled to contain an 
embedded stimulus during the relevant interval, 10 to contain an embedded stimulus before 
the interval (i.e. before the participant pressed the key or before the black square disappeared 
on its own), and 10 trials in which no embedded stimulus was scheduled. At the end of each 
trial, participants were prompted to estimate either the duration of the embedded stimulus, or 
the duration of the key press – outcome interval (on causal trials) or the duration between the 
disappearance of the black square and the appearance of the red square (on noncausal trials). 
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To schedule delivery of the embedded stimulus, an algorithm was used to predict 
participants’ key press time, with the embedded event scheduled at a random time (range 50 - 
400 ms) before or after the predicted key press. Based on pilot data, we set the algorithm to 
begin with a prediction of 800 ms on the first trial, and implemented a cumulative average 
based on key press times up to the first five trials. Thereafter, a rolling average calculated 
over the last five trials was employed. Values shorter than 400 ms or longer than 3000 ms 
were not considered for the averages.  
At the beginning of each causal trial, the computer thus determined the length of the 
to-be-experienced key press – outcome interval (from a random range of 700-1300 ms), as 
well as whether and when it was to contain an embedded event. If an embedded event was 
scheduled, its duration could be either 300 or 500 ms (see design specifics below). For the 
participant, the trial began with the display of the black square, which remained on the screen 
until he or she pressed the Z key, which led to the immediate disappearing of the black square 
and triggered the appearance of the red square after the scheduled interval. Depending on the 
schedule, the embedded event occurred between 50-400 ms before or after the predicted time 
of the key press, or not at all. Following the display of the outcome (red square), participants 
were prompted to estimate either the duration of the action-outcome interval (on a scale from 
0 – 2000 ms) or the duration of the embedded event (on a scale from 0 – 1000 ms). 
Participants estimated the duration by entering a numerical estimate in milliseconds. The 
screen then blanked for a random duration (1200 - 2000 ms) before the next trial.   
For noncausal trials we adopted an analogous procedure. We replayed values from 
causal trials of a pilot version of the experiment, where we recorded the time of participants’ 
key presses, the durations of the intervals, as well as the positions and durations of the 
embedded events (based on the same prediction algorithm as described above). In the current 
experiment, for each participant, we randomly selected a pilot participant’s data file and 
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replayed its values in noncausal trials, using the recorded key press time to schedule the 
disappearance of the black square. For example, if a pilot participant pressed the key 900 ms 
into the trial, experienced an interval of 1100 ms, with a 300 ms embedded event presented 
800 ms after his or her key press, a corresponding noncausal trial in the current experiment 
would display the black square for 900 ms at the start of the trial, followed by the red square 
after 1100 ms; in addition an embedded event of 300 ms duration would be presented 800 ms 
after the disappearance of the black square.   
Note that the algorithm cannot perfectly predict a participant’s key press, and that 
consequently the number of trials where the embedded event was experienced before or after 
the action will fluctuate between participants. Table 1 shows that the prediction algorithm 
achieved approximately equal distribution of embedded events before and during intervals. 
For example, Table 1 shows that for interval judgments in Experiment 1, 50.16% of 
embedded event trials featured an embedded event before the interval, out of a target of 50%. 
Likewise, 44.35% of trials featured an embedded event during the interval (also out of an 
intended target of 50%). Thus, there were no systematic deviations from the intended 50-50 
balance, and no deviation was larger than 9%. 
To optimize the experience on noncausal trials, we screened previous participants’ 
stimulus patterns and excluded those where embedded event timings deviated by more then 
30% from the schedule (e.g. where the balance of embedded events occurring before and 
during the relevant interval deviated from the scheduled 50-50% balance; fewer than 35% or 
greater than 65% resulted in exclusion. Each causal and noncausal block consisted of 30 trials 
prompting for an interval and 30 requesting an embedded event duration judgment, presented 
in random order. For each judgment type, there were 10 trials with the embedded event 
scheduled before, 10 with it scheduled during the interval, and 10 trials with no event. The 
duration of embedded events was either 300 or 500 ms, with both durations occurring equally 
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often across trial and judgment types. Ten trials in each block prompted for an embedded 
event judgment when in fact no embedded event had occurred.  These served as catch trials, 
and participants were instructed beforehand to enter an X on such trials. 
Each participant worked through two causal and noncausal blocks in an alternating 
sequence, with the beginning of the sequence (causal, noncausal) counterbalanced. 
Participants worked through the experiment in small groups of 10 - 15 students and the 
experiments took about 45 minutes. 
Results 
Data analysis  
Data were screened based on catch trials. Participants who failed to correctly 
recognize more than 30% of catch trials in at least one condition (Four participants in 
Experiment 1, two in Experiment 2) were not considered for analysis. In addition, while 
Table 1 and ANOVAs show that generally, the distribution of before and during interval 
embedded events did not differ between causal and noncausal trials, inspection of individual 
data revealed that certain participants experienced a distribution of causal before and during 
trials with greater than 30% deviance, i.e., some participants experienced fewer than 35% or 
greater than 65% of before and during trials, rather than the intended 50 - 50 balance. Twenty 
percent (Experiment 1) and 35% (Experiment 2) of participants fell into this category. Whilst 
we considered removing these participants from analyses, doing so does not change the 
pattern of results in any of the four experiments (all interval judgment ps < .05, all embedded 
event judgment ps > .05), so we decided to report analyses based on the entire valid sample.  
Data for interval judgments were classified into three categories: trials where an 
embedded event occurred before the interval, during interval, or not at all. Data for embedded 
event judgments were classified into two categories: trials where the embedded event 
occurred before the interval and trials where it occurred during the interval. Note that this 
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classification is based on actual rather than scheduled embedded event location, and 
classification is based on the start of the embedded event. This meant that some events began 
before but overlapped into the interval. Likewise, certain events began during the interval but 
overlapped into the outcome stimulus (in both cases this occurred on an average of 14.8% 
and 13.7% of trials in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). The analyses reported below 
included such overlapping trials (classified as Embedded Event Location: Before Interval, 
and During Interval); excluding them does not change the pattern of results (see Online 
Supplementary Materials). All analyses were computed with respect to judgment errors, 
defined as the difference between the estimated and the actual value, where underestimation 
is conveyed by negative values and overestimation by positive values. Preliminary analyses 
indicated that there were no main effects of, or interactions associated with Embedded Event 
Duration. We therefore conducted the analyses by collapsing across Embedded Event 
Duration. 
Interval Judgments: Experiment 1  
Figure 3 (A) shows that intervals were generally underestimated, with causal intervals 
underestimated to a greater extent, replicating the typical binding effect. An exception to this 
pattern of general underestimation is the result from noncausal intervals with an embedded 
event before the interval, which shows overestimation. Figure 3 also shows that intervals with 
an event presented during the interval were underestimated more than intervals with no event 
and an event before. We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Trial Type 
(causal, noncausal) and Embedded Event Location (none, before, during) as factors. This 
analysis found a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 24.97, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .45, 
and a significant effect of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 60) = 17.58, p < .001, partial η
2
 
= .37. The Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction was also significant, F(2, 60) = 
6.33, p < .01, partial η
2
 = .17. Simple effects analysis revealed that the main effect of Trial 
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Type was significant at all three levels of Embedded Event Location (all ps < .05). Post hoc 
tests also revealed that trials with an event during the interval were judged as significantly 
different than trials with an event before, or trials without an embedded event (both ps < .01). 
Additionally, noncausal trials with an event before significantly differed to all other Trial 
Type x Embedded Event Location combinations (all ps < .001).  
 
Interval Judgments: Experiment 2  
Figure 3 (B) shows that intervals again were generally underestimated, with greater 
underestimation for causal intervals. A deviation from this pattern, analogous to Experiment 
1, concerns interval judgments from noncausal trials where an embedded event occurred 
before the interval, which seemed to reflect overestimation. Above all, Figure 3 (B) shows a 
clear binding effect regardless of Embedded Event Location. ANOVA supports these 
findings, with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = 13.03, p < .01, partial η
2
 = .30. 
The effect of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 62) = 7.14, p < .01, partial η
2
 = .19, as well as 
the Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction, F(2, 62) = 3.75, p < .05, partial η
2
 
= .11, were also significant. Simple effects analysis revealed that the main effect of Trial 
Type was significant at Embedded Event Locations before (p < .001), and during the interval 
(p < .05), but not at the no event level (p = .10). Post hoc tests also revealed that trials with an 
event during the interval were judged as significantly different than trials with an event 
before, or trials without an embedded event (both ps < .01). Additionally, noncausal trials 
with an event before significantly differed to all other Trial Type x Embedded Event 
Location combinations (all ps < .01). 
Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 1  
Inspection of Figure 4 (A) finds a general overestimation of embedded events, with 
somewhat greater overestimation for events embedded in causal intervals, contrary to what is 
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predicted from a general clock slowing hypothesis. ANOVA with Trial Type (causal, 
noncausal) and Embedded Event Location (before, during] found no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 
30) = 1.29, p = .27, partial η
2
 = .04, or Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = .83, p = .37, 
partial η
2
 = .03, nor an interaction, F(1,30) < .01, p = .97, partial η
2
 < .001. In addition, we 
conducted a Bayesian analysis to compare the fit of the data under the null against the 
alternative hypothesis, using the Bayes Factor package in R (Morey & Rouder, 2015). Using 
the same 2 x 2 design, we compared a restricted model against the null (see Figure 5). The 
restricted model captured our original prediction, in which the means of events embedded 
during causal intervals would be subjectively shorter than those embedded during noncausal 
intervals. We did not specify any other order restrictions (i.e., we made no predictions about 
embedded events that occurred before the interval, either in causal or noncausal trials). This 
analysis yielded a Bayes factor of 22 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted 
model, suggesting that the data are around 22 times more likely to occur under the null than 
the alternative hypothesis.   
Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 2  
Figure 4 (B) shows that embedded visual events were underestimated, in contrast to 
embedded auditory events in Experiment 2, which were overestimated. This most likely 
reflects the typical finding that auditory events are judged longer than visual events (Wearden 
et al., 1998).  More important for our purposes here, though, is whether embedded event 
judgments varied as a function of Trial Type. As in Experiment 1, this was not the case. 
There were no significant effects of Trial Type, F(1, 31) = .03, p = .87, partial η
2
 < .01, 
Embedded Event Location, F(1, 31) = 2.36, p = .14, partial η
2
 = .07, nor a Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 31) = .00, p = .96, partial η
2
 < .001. We also 
conducted a Bayesian analysis using the same procedure we applied to embedded event 
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judgments in Experiment 1. This yielded a Bayes factor of 12 in favour of the null versus the 
alternative restricted model. 
Discussion 
In both experiments we replicated the temporal binding effect. Interval judgments in 
Experiments 1 and 2 show that causal intervals were perceived as shorter than noncausal 
intervals, regardless of Embedded Event Location and modality. Interestingly, we also found 
an interaction, whereby noncausal intervals with embedded event before the interval were 
perceived as longer than intervals with events embedded in other locations. While this is 
interesting, it is only tangential to our main purpose, and we return to this in the General 
Discussion. Our main concern was with temporal judgments for events embedded into causal 
and noncausal intervals.  We found no difference between causal and noncausal embedded 
event judgments, both when the event began before or during the interval, and irrespective of 
whether the event was auditory or visual. This is also the case for embedded events that are 
clearly delineated as before or during, i.e., no overlaps (see Supplementary Materials).  
What do these results say about clock slowing in temporal binding? If an internal 
clock operates at a slower speed during action-outcome intervals relative to noncausal 
intervals, then embedded events presented during the interval should be judged as shorter in 
causal than noncausal trials. Our results do not bear this out, with no difference in embedded 
event judgments between Trial Type or Location. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 provide no 
evidence for general clock slowing during temporal binding. Instead, it could be that binding-
induced clock slowing, rather than being a general cognitive process, selectively affects 
action-outcome intervals only. However, Experiments 1 and 2 only considered intervals 
marked by visual events.  To glean a better understanding, and in an attempt to test the 
reliability and robustness of these findings, Experiments 3 and 4 replicate Experiments 1 and 
2, but used an auditory event to mark the end of the action-outcome interval. 
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Experiments 3 and 4 
In Experiments 3 and 4 we replaced the visual outcome with an auditory stimulus. In 
other respects, the procedure remained the same as in Experiments 1 and 2 (see design 
specifics below).  
Method 
Participants  
Thirty-four students of Cardiff University participated both in Experiment 3 (30 
female, 4 male, Mage = 19.5 years, age range: 18-22) and another 34 in Experiment 4 (28 
female, 6 male, Mage = 21.9 years, age range: 17-46), in exchange for course credits or £5 
payment. 
Apparatus and stimuli  
The embedded event was a tone (523.25 Hz) in Experiment 3 and a yellow polygon 
(vertices bounded by a 270 x 210 [6.21° x 4.83°] pixel rectangle) in Experiment 4. In both 
experiments, a 130 ms click sound served as the outcome in causal trials and marked the end 
of noncausal intervals. A black square (400 [9.19°] pixels
2
) was presented at the beginning of 
each trial in both experiments. The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1.  
Design and procedure  
The procedure remained the same as Experiments 1 and 2.  
Results 
Data analysis  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, data were screened based on catch trials. This resulted in 
five participants in Experiment 3, and two in Experiment 4 not considered for analysis. The 
distributions of before and during interval embedded events for causal and noncausal trials 
are shown in Table 2. Twenty-four percent (Experiment 3) and 26% (Experiment 4) of 
participants deviated from the intended 50-50 balance. Removing these participants from 
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analyses did not change the pattern of results, and therefore we report the following results 
with these participants included. However, one participant was removed from analyses in 
Experiment 3 and another participant in Experiment 4, for not experiencing any causal trials 
with an event embedded during the interval. Finally, embedded events that began before but 
overlapped into the interval (in addition to events that began during the interval but 
overlapped into the outcome), were removed and the data subjected to reanalysis (this 
occurred on average on 14.8% and 15.5% of trials per participant in Experiments 3 and 4, 
respectively). The analyses reported below included such overlapping trials; excluding them 
does not change the pattern of results (see Supplementary Online Material).  
Intervals Judgments: Experiment 3  
Figure 6 (A) shows a similar pattern to Experiments 1 and 2. On the whole, intervals 
were underestimated, with greater underestimation for causal trials. Two exceptions are 
noncausal trials where an embedded event occurred before the interval, and trials where no 
event occurred. The former replicates a pattern shown in Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting 
that the presence of an event presented before the interval subjectively lengthens its duration 
(we explore reasons for this in the General Discussion). In general, Figure 5 shows a clear 
binding effect, regardless of Embedded Event Location. ANOVA supports these findings, 
with a significant effect of Trial Type, F(1, 27) = 44.77, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .62. The effect 
of Embedded Event Location, F(2, 54) = 12.56, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .32, and the Trial Type 
x Embedded Event Location interaction was also significant, F(2, 54) = 6.70, p < .05, partial 
η
2
 = .20. Simple effects analysis revealed that the effect of Trial Type was significant at all 
levels of Embedded Event Location (all ps < .001). Post hoc tests also revealed that trials 
with an event during the interval were judged as significantly different than trials with an 
event before, or trials without an embedded event (both ps < .01). Additionally, noncausal 
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trials with an event before significantly differed to all other Trial Type x Embedded Event 
Location combinations (all ps < .01). 
Interval Judgments: Experiment 4  
Figure 6 (B) shows a different pattern to Experiments 1 - 3, with a general 
overestimation of noncausal trial intervals. However, a clear binding effect is evident, 
regardless of Embedded Event Location. ANOVA supports this finding, with a main effect of 
Trial Type, F(1, 30) = 80.31, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .73 and Embedded Event Location, F(2, 
60) = 15.37, p < .001, partial η
2
 = .34. No Trial Type x Embedded Event Location interaction 
was found, F(2, 60) = 1.57, p = .22, partial η
2
 = .05. Post hoc tests also revealed that trials 
with an event during the interval were not judged as significantly different than trials with an 
event before (p = .13), but were significantly different to trials without a before embedded 
event (both p < .001). Additionally, noncausal trials with an event before significantly 
differed to all other Trial Type x Embedded Event Location combinations (all ps < .001). 
Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 3  
Figure 7 (A) shows that embedded events are overestimated, corroborating the finding 
of Experiment 1. Inspection of Figure 7 (A) also suggests that, numerically, at least the 
pattern found in Experiment 1 might be reversed:  events presented during causal trials might 
have been perceived as shorter than those presented during noncausal trials. However, 
ANOVA does not corroborate this impression: The effect of Trial Type failed to reach 
significance, F(1, 27) = 3.94, p = .06, partial η
2
 = .13, and neither the effect of Embedded 
Event Location, F(1, 27) = 1.71, p = .20, partial η
2
 = .06, or  the Trial Type x Embedded 
Event Location interaction, F(1, 27) = .25, p = .62, partial η
2
 = .01 were significant. A 
Bayesian analysis yielded a Bayes factor of 1 in favour of the null versus the alternative 
restricted model (see Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 1 and Figure 4 for specifics). 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 24 
Thus, the evidence that events embedded during causal intervals are not perceived as shorter 
than those embedded during noncausal intervals, is inconclusive here. 
Embedded Event Judgments: Experiment 4 
Figure 7 (B) shows a general underestimation of embedded events, replicating the 
results of Experiment 2’s embedded events (i.e., that auditory stimuli are judged longer than 
visual stimuli). Similarly to Experiment 3, Figure 7 (B) also suggests relative underestimation 
of embedded events in causal trials. However, just as in Experiment 3, statistical analysis 
does not bear this out, with no effect of Trial Type, F(1, 30) = .42, p = .52, partial η
2
 = .01, 
Embedded Event Location, F(1, 30) = .22, p = .64, partial η
2
 < .01, or Trial Type x 
Embedded Event Location interaction, F(1, 30) = .06, p = .82, partial η
2
 < .01. A Bayesian 
analysis found a factor of 12 in favour of the null versus the alternative restricted model.  
Discussion 
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 replicate those of Experiments 1 and 2: We found 
a significant binding effect, regardless of Embedded Event Location and modality. 
Furthermore, Experiment 4 found general overestimation of noncausal intervals in all 
conditions, a pattern not found in the previous Experiments.  The important point though, is 
that we replicated the binding effect in both experiments. Additionally, in Experiment 3 we 
also replicated the finding that noncausal intervals with an embedded event occurring before 
it were judged as longer than other Trial Type x Embedded Event Location combinations. As 
stated in the previous section, we will comment on this in the General Discussion. Regarding 
embedded event judgments, we again found no difference between temporal estimates of 
events embedded into causal and noncausal intervals, nor any differences depending on 
whether the event occurred before or during the interval. While the pattern of embedded 
event judgments is numerically reversed relative to Experiments 1 and 2, with the shortening 
of perceived durations for events embedded into causal intervals approaching statistical 
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significance in Experiment 3, we attribute this fluctuation to random noise, and perhaps 
changes to the outcome modality. Crucially, however, Experiments 3 and 4, like Experiments 
1 and 2 do not support the hypothesis of general clock slowing, which would be evidenced by 
reliable subjective shortening of events embedded into causal intervals.  Furthermore, neither 
Experiment 3 nor Experiment 4 showed any evidence of embedded event judgments being 
affected by Event Location. If traces of relative underestimation of events embedded into 
causal intervals were driven by general clock slowing during causal intervals, then such 
underestimation should only occur for events presented during causal intervals, and not for 
those presented before them. Results from both Experiments 3 and 4 clearly show no 
evidence for this, neither numerically, nor via a Trial Type x Embedded Event Location 
interaction. This result also holds when embedded events are clearly delineated, i.e., when 
embedded events before do not overlap into the interval (see Supplementary Materials).   
General Discussion 
We developed a new procedure - the embedded interval estimation procedure - to 
study the potential implication of internal clock models in temporal binding. Using this 
method, we replicated the binding effect across four experiments, with causal intervals being 
consistently judged as shorter than noncausal intervals, irrespective of whether or when an 
additional event was embedded in the overall interval, and irrespective of the modality of the 
embedded event, and that marking the end of the interval. Interestingly, we found that when 
tones were deployed as embedded events (in Experiments 1 and 3), they were generally 
overestimated, while visual stimuli serving as embedded events (Experiments 2 and 4) were 
generally underestimated. This replicates a well-established finding that auditory stimuli are 
judged as relatively longer than visual stimuli (Wearden et al., 1998) and reassures us of the 
overall validity of the embedded interval estimation method. 
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Contrary to what would be predicted if temporal binding were effected via a general 
slowing of subjective time, we found evidence of no difference in perceived duration of 
events embedded within causal and noncausal intervals. This pattern of results held across 
four experiments and regardless of whether the interval was marked by a visual or auditory 
event. Likewise, it was unaffected by whether the embedded event was visual or auditory. 
Interestingly, removing overlapping embedded events does not change the pattern of results. 
One anonymous reviewer expressed the concern that our failure to find an effect of causality 
on embedded event judgments, might simply be due to the (relatively) short durations we 
employed for embedded events; differences in r might be more likely to manifest at longer 
intervals. It is certainly true that differences in r are more likely to manifest, the longer the 
duration to be timed. However, Humphreys & Buehner (2009) found that participants gave 
shorter estimates for causal, compared to noncausal intervals, at durations as short as 150 ms. 
Thus, causality-induced changes to interval estimation do manifest even at very short 
durations. Because the shortest embedded event duration in the present study was twice this 
duration (i.e., 300 ms), we would argue the absence of a causal vs non-causal difference for 
embedded event judgments indeed reflects an absence of a difference in r, rather than the 
inability of such a difference to manifest due to short duration. 
Naturally, one always has to be cautious when interpreting null results. However, a 
Bayesian analysis of temporal judgments found Bayes factors greater than 10, in favor of the 
null hypothesis in three of the four experiments reported here (Experiments 1, 2, and 4; the 
exception is Experiment 3, which yielded a factor of less than 1). Furthermore, we combined 
the data from all Experiments and conducted an ANOVA with Embedded Event Modality 
and Outcome Modality as between-subjects factors. The results of this pooled analysis found 
significant effects of Embedded Event Modality (p < .001) and an Outcome Modality x Trial 
Type interaction (p < .05), reflecting the findings discussed above, namely that (1) auditory 
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stimuli are judged as longer than visual (Wearden at el., 1998), and (2) the numerical 
difference between judgment errors for events embedded in causal versus noncausal intervals 
reversed when the modality of the outcome stimulus was auditory compared to when it was 
visual. More importantly, we found no significant effects of Trial Type (p = .34) nor a Trial 
Type x Embedded Event Location interaction (p = .67). This corroborates the main 
observation that events embedded in causal intervals are not judged as shorter than events 
embedded in noncausal intervals, regardless of stimuli (outcome and embedded event) 
modality. Finally, we compared the restricted model against the null (see Embedded Event 
Judgments: Experiment 1) to yield a Bayes factor of 99 in favour of the null versus the 
alternative restricted model, pooling the data from all four Experiments (this pattern also 
holds for data with no overlapping embedded events; see Pooled Analysis in Supplementary 
Online Materials). In general then, this pattern represents positive evidence against a 
difference between events embedded in causal versus noncausal intervals. 
An unanticipated result concerns noncausal intervals on trials with an embedded event 
before the interval, which were consistently judged as longer than any other interval category. 
One explanation implicates the trial structure we employed: Because on a given trial at most 
one embedded event occurred, the presentation of an event before the interval meant that 
participants knew that no further event will occur during the remainder of the trial. 
Participants would then have been able to attend exclusively to the interval, whereas 
otherwise they would still have to divide their attention between tracking overall interval 
duration and monitoring the potential occurrence of an embedded event. A common 
assumption in internal clock models is that subjective time is modulated by attention, with 
greater attention paid to time passing resulting in more clock pulses accrued, which in turn 
leads to the experience of a subjectively longer interval (cf. the common adage “A watched 
pot never boils” or “Time flies when you are having fun”, Avni-Babad & Ritov, 2003). This 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 28 
attentional modulation would of course have affected causal and noncausal trials equally, and 
indeed this is reflected by analogously less negative judgment errors on causal trials with an 
interval embedded before the trial, relative to causal trials with an interval embedded during 
the trial. However, the binding effect evidently was robust enough to prevent causal intervals 
preceded by an embedded event from being overestimated. Another explanation is that 
interval judgments are biased by some property of the embedded event. For example, if an 
embedded event occurs before the marker delineating the start of the interval (disappearance 
of the black square or key press), perception of the marker could be biased towards the earlier 
embedded event. Consequently, the interval would then be perceived as longer. In contrast, if 
the embedded event occurs after the marker, such biases would lead to relatively shorter 
perception of the interval (we thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion). 
Importantly however, the finding that temporal binding is robust regardless of the 
presence, location or modality of embedded events demonstrates the reliability of the 
procedure. What then, can our results say about how temporal binding relates to time 
perception itself? At a minimum, our results show that temporal binding does not occur due 
to general slowing of the pacemaker. Does this rule out a clock-slowing account of temporal 
binding altogether? Not necessarily. It could be entirely possible that temporal binding 
selectively affects a dedicated time-keeping processes, allocated to keeping track of action-
outcome (or cause-effect) intervals. Computationally, this would necessitate multiple clocks, 
each capable of independent and simultaneous timing. Klapproth (2011) provides evidence 
for such a notion. Using the temporal production technique, in which a key press terminates a 
temporally extended stimulus, participants were required to simultaneously produce two 
partially overlapping durations. More specifically, one (longer) duration served as the target 
interval, and the participant always began timing (i.e. producing) this interval first. Sometime 
after the onset of the stimulus that was used to demarcate the target interval, a second 
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temporally extended stimulus was presented, which served to demarcate a distracter interval. 
The temporally extended stimuli that defined the two to-be-produced target and distracter 
durations were visual or auditory (factorially combined). Klapproth’s aim was to determine 
whether simultaneous timing (of separate durations) is effected via a single internal clock, or 
multiple clocks operating in parallel. The rationale was that multiple clocks would result in 
modality specific effects on clock speed: if auditory clocks run faster than visual ones (as 
found by Wearden et al, 1998) then auditory stimuli should be produced in less time than 
visual stimuli (the faster auditory clock would mean that pulses representing a given duration 
are accumulated in less objective time than pulses emitted from a visual clock). A key 
prediction made by Klapproth therefore was that auditory distractor events should result in 
shorter production times than visual distractors, regardless of whether they were embedded 
within auditory or visual target intervals. The results supported this prediction, in line with a 
multiple clock account of simultaneous timing. Given that there is precedence in the literature 
for multiple clock processes operating simultaneously, and at different clock speeds, it might 
well be possible that temporal binding reflects a change in time-keeping specific to tracking 
the elapsed interval between cause and effect. One possibility, for example, would be that r 
for clocks that time cause-effect intervals is lower relative to clocks dedicated to other timing 
processes.  
One study that provides evidence for changes in r during temporal binding is 
Humphreys and Buehner (2009). Using a verbal judgment paradigm, they found a linear 
relationship between perceived and actual durations for a range of causal and non-causal 
intervals. Importantly, they reported different slopes for causal and noncausal conditions, 
suggesting a stable pacemaker rate within but variable between condition(s). Specifically, a 
shallower slope for subjective durations of causal relative to non-causal intervals suggested 
that clock processes dedicated to timing causal intervals ran slower than those used for 
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tracking other events. Fereday, Buehner & Rushton (in preparation) replicated this result 
using a temporal discrimination paradigm.  Importantly, they also found impaired temporal 
resolution during causal sequences: In a separate series of experiment, participants 
discriminated between either two key press – flash intervals, or two flash – flash intervals (in 
causal and non-causal conditions, respectively). Across a range of durations (250 – 850 ms), 
the discrimination thresholds were larger for causal than non-causal intervals, meaning that 
temporal acuity was reduced in causal conditions, as would be predicted by reduced r. 
How do our findings relate to Wenke and Haggard (2009)? As noted in the 
Introduction, it is likely that Wenke and Haggard’s results do not reflect clock slowing but 
instead simply reflect motor-specific contraction of discrimination thresholds at the effector, 
which is independent of binding (Tomassini et al., 2014). Further, internal clock models are 
concerned with interval perception, and it is difficult to see how they may be applied to 
simultaneity judgments.  
Is binding effected by shifts in event perception? 
Until now we have discussed our results in light of the possibility that temporal 
binding might reflect a slowing of pacemaker speed r, with the important qualification that 
such changes would need to be specific to timekeeping of the cause-effect interval, and 
would not affect the timing of other events. However, our results are equally consistent with 
the possibility of causality-specific changes to timing latencies Lc and Lo: A delay between 
the actual onset of a causal interval and subjective timing, such that subjective timing begins 
relatively later for causal compared to non-causal intervals would also result in shorter 
perceived durations. Similarly, if subjective timing terminates earlier in a causal condition 
relative to a noncausal one, then this would also contribute to shorter perceived durations. In 
other words, temporal binding could be due to causality-specific slowing of r, or to causality-
specific changes in Lc and Lo.   
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A different perspective to temporal binding, one that does not explicitly draw on 
processes of time perception, is that binding reflects subjective shifts in event perception 
(Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002): The consequences of causal actions are perceived earlier, 
relative to other events occurring in the environment. Importantly, this perspective need not 
be mutually exclusive from an approach inspired by internal clock models: A slower r for 
action-outcome timing, for example, can lead to a subjective contraction of time (i.e., 
binding), which in turn would result in the outcome perceived sooner. Importantly, the 
outcome would only be perceived sooner (relative to other events in the environment), if the 
slowing of r is specific to the cause-effect interval. In this case, the action-outcome clock rate 
would differ to that of other timing streams, meaning that the outcome would be perceived 
earlier relative to other events timed at a standard clock rate. A general slowing of r, in 
contrast, would not lead to an earlier perception of the outcome relative to other events, 
because all events would now be judged in relation to the same slowed clock speed, and thus 
would shift by the same amount. 
Alternatively, if temporal binding were effected via changes in switch latency Lc and 
Lo (as opposed to, or in addition to causality-specific changes in r), such changes in latency 
could correspond to a perception that the event marking the start of the interval was perceived 
subjectively later, while the event marking the end of the interval was perceived subjectively 
earlier. Consequently, the idea that temporal binding is effected via changes to clock 
processes that are specific to the causal interval can account not only for distortions of 
interval perception as reported in this paper, but also for the perceived shifts in event 
perception reported elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Buehner, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 
2010; Haggard et al., 2002). A key task for future research is to determine whether such 
causality-induced changes to clock processes reflect differences in clock rate or timing 
latencies (or both).  
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A cue combination account? 
Temporal binding has recently been interpreted in light of a cue-combination 
perspective (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013; Kawabe, 
Roseboom, & Nishida, 2013).  This traces back to seminal work conducted by Ernst and 
Banks (2012) in the domain of multi-sensory integration.  Ernst and Banks found that 
judgments of stimulus height were based on an integration of visual and haptic cues.  
Importantly, they found that cue integration operates in a statistically optimal manner, such 
that cues associated with less variability (i.e. those that are more reliable) are weighted more 
heavily when forming an integrated judgment: systematic degradation of one signal (optic vs 
haptic) led to increased weighting of the other signal.  In the context of temporal binding, the 
different cues that could be available are predictions of an internal forward model of the 
sensory consequences of one’s action, proprioception of the action (or perception of the start 
of the interval), as well the feedback of the sensory consequence / end of interval itself 
(arguably, higher level beliefs about causality and agency might also be considered as cues 
here); these cues can then be combined to yield a posterior estimate of either the action-
outcome interval, the sense of agency, or the time of action and the time of outcome.  
Interestingly, and in parallel with Ernst and Banks, Wolpe et al., using an event-perception 
paradigm, found reduced temporal binding of actions to their effects in situations where the 
outcome signal was degraded.  It is not clear, however, how such accounts apply in situations 
involving prospective timing.  Presumably, one could argue that the perceived time of the 
start and end of the to-be-timed interval is subject to biases, while time perception itself still 
operates according to SET.  In the context of our experiments, the salient difference between 
causal and non-causal conditions was that the former employed a key press, whereas the 
latter a click-sound as the start of the to-be-timed interval; the end point was always the same.  
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been more precise (and therefore more reliable) than the representation of the click sound.  
Applying the above logic then suggests that the perceived time of the end of the interval 
would be biased more strongly towards a key press (start of causal trials) than towards a click 
sound (start of non-causal trials). Conversely, the perceived time of the click (marking the 
start of a non-causal interval) would be subject to greater bias from the event marking the end 
of the interval than the perceived time of an action (marking the start of a causal interval).  
With respect to interval estimation – the variable of interest in the work presented here – this 
means that there are two tendencies operating in opposite directions.  Yet we observed a clear 
and unambiguous temporal binding effect, such that causal intervals were always judged as 
shorter than non-causal intervals, regardless of stimulus modality, and, importantly, 
regardless of whether or not there were embedded events present, and regardless of whether 
the embedded events occurred before or during the interval.  A cue combination account 
therefore cannot explain the overall binding effect purely on the basis of differential signal 
precision.  However, if one adds prior beliefs (in this cause about causality) to the account, it 
can (Moore & Fletcher, 2012).  Importantly, our work has shown that temporal binding is not 
driven by bottom-up biases to local (intervening, embedded) events, but that it is rooted in a 
persistent linkage between cause and effect.  At the same time, the effect is highly specific, 
and limited to the cause-effect interval, and does not extend to other temporal events, even 
when they occur concurrently with the causal interval.  A cue-combination interpretation of 
our results therefore would be that causality biases the judgments of elapsed time between 
cause and effect, and that this bias is highly specific to the causal interval, such that other, 
concurrently occurring events are not subject to the same bias. 
In sum, our results have conclusively ruled out the possibility that temporal binding is 
effected by a general slowing of an internal clock. Instead, they suggest that causality-
induced changes in time perception necessitate the operation of multiple specific clock 
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processes, such that causality leads to changes in r for the clock that tracks the cause-effect 
interval. Alternatively, causality could lead to changes in switch latencies Lc and Lo, which 
determine when time-keeping for cause-effect intervals begins and ends. One way to 
disentangle these accounts is by systematically investigating clock processes in causal and 
noncausal intervals with regression models. Other work from our lab (Fereday, Rushton & 
Buehner, in preparation) found conclusive evidence for causality-specific changes to clock 
rate. For now, however, we conclude that the perceptual shifts associated with temporal 
causal binding occur due to changes in time-keeping processes specific to the causal interval. 
Whether these changes reflect a causality-specific slowing of clock-rate, changes to switch-
latencies, or systematic biases induced via cue-combination is a matter to be explored 
elsewhere. 
 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 35 
 
References 
Avni-Babad, D., & Ritov, I. (2003). Routine and the perception of time. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 132(4), 543-550. 
Bryce, D., Seifried-Dubon, T., & Bratzke, D. (2015). How are overlapping time intervals 
perceived? Evidence for a weighted sum of segments model. Acta Psychologica, 156, 
83-95.  
Buehner. M. J. (2005). Contiguity and covariation in human causal inference. Learning and 
Behavior, 33(2), 230-238.  
Buehner, M. J. (2012). Understanding the past, predicting the future: causation, not 
intentional action, is the root of temporal binding. Psychological Science, 23(12), 
1490-1497.  
Buehner, M. J. (2015). Awareness of voluntary and involuntary actions and their outcomes. 
Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2(3), 237-252. 
Buehner, M. J., & Humphreys, G. R. (2009). Causal binding of actions to their effects. 
Psychological Science, 20(10), 1221-1228. 
Buehner, M. J., & Humphreys, G. R. (2010). Causal contraction: spatial binding in the 
perception of collision events. Psychological Science, 21(1), 44-48. 
Buhusi, C. V., & Meck, W. H. (2009). Relativity theory and time perception: single or 
multiple clocks? PLoS ONE, 4, e6268. 
Cheng, P. W. & Buehner, M. J. (2012). Causal Learning. In K. J. Holyoak & R. G. Morrison  
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (pp. 210-233). Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 36 
Cousineau, D. (2005). Confidence intervals in within-subjects designs: A simpler solution to 
Loftus and Masson’s method. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 1, 
42-45. 
Droit-Volet, S., & Meck, W. H. (2007). How emotions colour our perception of time. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 11(12), 504-513. 
Eagleman, D. (2008). Human time perception and its illusions. Current Opinon in 
Neurobiology, 18, 131-136. 
Eagleman, D. M., & Holcombe, A. O. (2002). Causality and the perception of time. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 6(8), 323-325. 
Fereday, R., Bueher, M., & Rushton, S. (2016). Causality impairs temporal resolution: 
accounting for temporal binding with the internal clock model. Manuscript in 
preparation. 
Gibbon, J., Church, R. M., & Meck, W. H. (1984). Scalar timing in memory. In J. Gibbon & 
L. G. Allan (Eds.), Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Timing and time 
perception (pp. 52-77). New York: New York Academy of Sciences. 
Haering, C., & Kiesel, A. (2014). Intentional binding is independent of the validity of the 
action effect’s identity. Acta Psychologica, 152, 109-119. 
Haering, C., & Kiesel, A. (2015). Was it me when it happened too early? Experience of 
delayed effects shapes sense of agency. Cognition, 136, 38-42. 
Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385. 
Hume, D. (1888). Hume’s treatise of human nature (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed.). Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press (Original work published 1739) . 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 37 
Humphreys, G. R., & Buehner, M. J. (2009). Magnitude estimation reveals binding at super-
second intervals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 35(5), 1542-1549. 
Humphreys, G. R., & Buehner, M. J. (2010). Temporal binding of action and effect in 
interval reproduction. Experimental Brain Research, 203(2), 465-470. 
Kawabe, T., Roseboom, W., & Nishida, S. (2013). The sense of agency is action-effect 
causality perception based on cross-modal grouping. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences, 280(1763), 20130991–20130991. 
Klapproth, F. (2011). Temporal decision making in simultaneous timing. Frontiers in 
Integrative Neuroscience, 5(71),1-10.  
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention 
to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Brain, 106, 623-
642. 
Matthews, W. J. (2013). How does sequence structure affect the judgment of time? Exploring 
a weighted sum of segments model. Cognitive Psychology, 66, 259-282. 
Moore, J. W., & Fletcher, P. C. (2012). Sense of agency in health and disease: a review of 
cue integration approaches. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 59–68. 
Moore, J., & Haggard, P. (2008). Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 136-144.  
Moore, J., Lagnado, D., Deal, D. C., & Haggard, P. (2009). Feelings of control: contingency 
determines experience of action. Cognition, 110, 279-283. 
Morey, R. D. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A correction to Cousineau 
(2005). Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 4, 61-64.  
Morey, R. D., & Rouder, J. N. (2015). BayesFactor (Version 0.9.11-3)[Computer software]. 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 38 
Nolden, S., Haering, C., & Kiesel, A. (2012). Assessing intentional binding with the method 
of constant stimuli. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(3), 1176-1185. 
Pariyadath, V., & Eaglman, D. (2007). The effect of predictability on subjective duration. 
PLoS ONE, 11, e1264. 
Penton-Voak, I. S., Edwards, H., Percival, A., & Wearden, J. H. (1996). Speeding up an 
internal clock in humans? Effects of click trains on subjective duration. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 22, 307-320. 
Pierce, J. (2007). Psychopy – Psychophysics software in Python. Journal of Neuroscience 
Methods, 162(1-2), 8-13. 
Tomassini, A., Gori, M., Baud-Bovy, G., Sandini, G., & Morrone, M. C. (2014). Motor 
commands induce time compression for tactile stimuli. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
34(27), 9164-9172. 
Wearden, J. H. (2003). Applying the scalar timing model to human time psychology: 
Progress and challenges. In H. Helfrich (Ed.), Time and Mind II: Information-
processing perspectives (pp. 21-39). Gottingen: Hogrefe & Huber. 
Wearden, J. H., Edwards, H., Fakhri, M., & Percival, A. (1998). Why “sounds are judged 
longer than lights”: Application of a model of the internal clock in humans. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 51B, 97-120. 
Wenke, D., & Haggard, P. (2009). How voluntary actions modulate time perception. 
Experimental Brain Research, 196(3), 311-318. 
Wolpe, N., Haggard, P., Siebner, H. R., & Rowe, J. B. (2013). Cue integration and the 
perception of action in intentional binding. Experimental Brain Research, 229(3), 
467–474. 
TEMPORAL BINDING AND INTERNAL CLOCKS 39 
Footnotes 
 
1 Naturally, the second shock might also be bound to the action. No previous 
research has investigated whether action-effect binding extends to multiple events caused by 
the same action. However, previous research (e.g. Haggard et al., 2002) showed that the 
extent of binding decreases with increasing action-effect intervals.  Consequently, one could 
expect that the second shock would be bound to the action to a lesser extent than the first 
shock, and this would lead to an overall lengthening of the subjective inter-shock interval – 
which would give rise to an apparently higher simultaneity detection threshold. 
2 The pilot experiment consisted of 24 participants using a procedure similar to 
that in the present experiments. The only difference was that causal blocks were experienced 
first, with the values for different stimuli durations (interval duration, time of key press, time 
of embedded event etc) replayed in noncausal blocks. This pilot experiment used the same 
prediction algorithm as the current experiments.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 1 and 2 
(standard deviation in parenthesis). 
 
 
Judgment 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal 
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI 
Intervals 
 
50.16 
(11.09) 
44.35 
(12.63) 
41.94 
(6.28) 
53.63 
(6.35) 
47.66 
(9.71) 
45.55 
(11.55) 
44.38 
(7.04) 
51.72 
(6.64) 
Embedded 
Event 
50.40 
(10.02) 
45.16 
(11.76) 
46.05 
(5.62) 
49.27 
(6.23) 
51.41 
(10.34) 
41.95 
(12.28) 
46.48 
(5.53) 
48.67 
(6.57) 
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 3.91 - 6.80% of trials contained embedded events that began 
during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x 
Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent variable was 
the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects (ps>.05), with 
one exception: Interval judgment trials in Experiment 2 had more events in noncausal than 
causal trials (means of 48.05 and 46.60 %, collapsed across BI and DI trials, respectively), 
F(1, 31) = 7.79, p < .01. We attribute this to random fluctuation. 
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Table 2 
Mean percentage of trials on which an embedded event was experienced before and during 
the overall interval, for interval and embedded event judgment trials in Experiments 3 and 4 
(standard deviation in parenthesis). 
 
 
Judgment 
Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Causal Noncausal Causal Noncausal 
BI DI BI DI BI DI BI DI 
Intervals 
 
48.93 
(11.37) 
46.61 
(12.55) 
43.93 
(4.69) 
52.50 
(4.56) 
50.73 
(17.04) 
45.40 
(17.37) 
45.32 
(8.34) 
51.21 
(8.01) 
Embedded 
Event 
46.34 
(10.33) 
49.20 
(11.55) 
45.00 
(5.93) 
50.63 
(7.03) 
53.63 
(15.86) 
43.06 
(15.35) 
46.61 
(5.11) 
48.87 
(5.73) 
Note: BI, DI = Embedded Event occurred before/during the interval. Percentages do not sum 
to 100 because a mean range of 3.33 - 4.58% of trials contained embedded events that began 
during or after the outcome, and are thus not included. 2 x 2 (Trial Type [causal, noncausal] x 
Embedded Event Location [before, during]) ANOVAs in which the dependent variable was 
the proportion of trials with an embedded event, found no significant effects (ps>.05). 
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Figure 1. Predictions for trials with an embedded event during the interval. Interval 
judgments: we predict a temporal binding effect regardless of theoretical approach. 
Embedded event judgments: Only a general pacemaker slowing will result in shorter 
perceived embedded events during causal intervals. C: Causal; NC: Non-Causal. 
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Figure 2. Trial structure of Experiment 1. In causal trials a black square was displayed until 
participants pressed a key, which led to the immediate disappearance of the square and 
triggered an outcome stimulus after a random interval (700 - 1300 ms). In noncausal trials a 
black square was displayed for a random time (replayed from a pilot version of the 
experiment) before disappearing, followed by an outcome stimulus after a random interval of 
the same 700 - 1300 ms range. Additionally, in both trial types an event was embedded 
before or during the interval, or in some trials no embedded event was scheduled. 
Participants estimated the duration of either the interval or embedded event. In all 
experiments a black square always began the display, while the modality of outcomes and 
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embedded events varied factorially between experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2 the 
outcome was a red square, and in Experiments 3 and 4 an auditory click sound. Meanwhile, 
the embedded event was a tone in Experiments 1 and 3, and a polygon in Experiments 2 and 
4.  
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Figure 3. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Mean interval judgment errors from causal 
and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event location. Error bars represent within-
subjects confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). 
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Figure 4. (A) Experiment 1. (B) Experiment 2. Mean embedded event judgment errors for 
events occurring before and during the interval, broken down by Trial Type. Error bars 
represent within-subjects confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5. The restricted model entered into our Bayesian analysis. We specified a single 
constraint: events embedded during causal intervals would be judged shorter than events 
embedded into noncausal intervals. We made no assumptions about any other differences. 
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Figure 6. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Mean interval judgment errors from causal 
and noncausal trials broken down by embedded event location. Error bars represent within-
subjects confidence intervals.  
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Figure 7. (A) Experiment 3. (B) Experiment 4. Mean embedded event judgment errors for 
events occurring before and during the interval, broken down by Trial Type. Error bars 
represent within-subjects confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
